The crisis of the late 1970s therefore presaged a decline in living standards and economic stagnation that was portrayed as an ‘African tragedy’ by the 1990s (Arrighi, 2002). Cheng, J. Y. S. and Shi, H. (2009) ‘China’s African Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 39, 1, 87-115. Australia National University: Canberra. Hence, Chinese economic pragmatism dogma coupled with low concerns for welfare of African population and human rights abuses, and its closeness to political elites do raise some legitimate questions upon the neo-colonialist nature of Sino-African relations. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2010) Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of Nations – Pathways to Human Development. In C. Alden, D. Large, and R. Soares de Oliveira (eds.) 102-103; Zhu 2017, p. 23). It argues that while Chinese involvement in the continent is problematic, it certainly does not merit accusations of neo-colonialism greater than that of other more-established Western actors. Date written: November 2018, All content on the website (with the exception of images) is published under the following Creative Commons License, Copyright © — E-International Relations. It then moves on to depict how China’s renewed interest in the continent has been manifested, and subsequently provides an analysis of its main effects –  using the examples of Angola, Sudan, and Zambia to illustrate particular aspects of contemporary Sino-African relations. (2010) The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa. Brautigam, D. (2009) The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Indeed, the resource curse stemming from continued accrual of rents from oil and other raw materials may reinforce the neo-patrimonialism and extraversion of many African rentier state elites, with ‘enclave economies’ focusing on external markets and contributing little to local employment or wider national development (Taylor, 2010: 135-136). Taylor, I. Since President Xi Jinping has taken office in 2012, the CCP has pursued more aggressive policies abroad which legitimately raised questions about China’s role in the international system as a revisionist or status quo power. Shaxson, N. (2005) ‘New approaches to volatility: dealing with the ‘resource curse’ in sub-Saharan Africa’, International Affairs, 81, 2, 311-324. 976-998. Marxists Internet Archive website at http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nkrumah/neo-colonialism/introduction.htm, accessed 17 March 2012. In In C. Alden, D. Large, and R. Soares de Oliveira (eds.) At present, the Sino-African relationship appears – despite its various manifestations – to be broadly popular both in its own right and in comparison to the West: when asked the explicit question of whether China is practising any form of neo-colonialism, African survey respondents overwhelmingly reject the notion (Sautman Hairong, 2009). The existing literature on these relations has, to a large extent, not sufficiently located the discourse within the existing dominant ideologies, namely neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism. 2, pp. 8, no. 8, no. After winning the 2011 presidential elections upon the labelling of Chinese businesses as neo-colonialists and the promise of stricter regulations of trade practices, Michael Sata has been left powerless in face of increasing Chinese firms lobbying and threat of closing down crucial economic operations. Sitting on the Fence: Cautious Approach to China in Africa. 29, no. In this regard, China is acting like any other emerging power would act. Bi-lateral agre… Nkrumah, K. (1965) Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. BIDD gathers different generations of university researchers, industry specialists, public policy officials and experienced diplomats who got educated and worked in Serbia, Germany, The United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia, PR of China, Middle East, USA, Brazil and s.o. According to Nkrumah, neo-colonialism can be interpreted as the diminution of African states’ sovereignty through asymmetric economic relations and inequitable trade and investment between the parties (Langan 2017, p. 89). Parallel to this, Asian states’ capture of the manufacturing sector, and continued barriers to developed world trade, contributed further to African states’ development failures (Melamed, 2006). Another case in point is the support China provided to Francois Bozize’s dictatorial regime in Central African Republic in 2003 through financial investment in building mining and telecommunications infrastructures, hence keeping the economy, and by extension the regime, afloat (Halper 2010, p. 81). Clearly, such rhetoric contrasts starkly with the power asymmetry between China and African states, calling for attention on the ability of African governments to maintain their sovereignty upon domestic and foreign policies. 19, pp. 95-96). Building on this seemingly shared identity, the CCP has constructed its African approach upon the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which emphasises mutual respect for states’ sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence (Chen 2016, p. 112). In order to understand the continent’s apparent susceptibility to various forms of economic and political exploitation, we must first look briefly – and in admittedly oversimplified terms – to the nature of African state formation since the colonial era. Written for: Karen Treasure 100-122. Hence, as concisely summarised by Mark Beeson (2018, p. 245), “Africa is providing an important testing ground for China’s evolving resource diplomacy and its efforts to ensure long-term economic security and influence”. By Ellington Ngandu. 3, pp. This work can be used for background reading and research, but should not be cited as an expert source or used in place of scholarly articles/books. However, abiding completely by this perspective might hurt African states’ interests in the long-run. 2, pp. Tull, D. (2006) ‘China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 459-479. 982-983). Okolo, AL & Akwu, JO 2016, ‘China’s Foreign Direct Investment in Africa’s Land: Hallmarks of Neo-Colonialism or South-South Cooperation?’, Africa Review, vol. In 2000, China’s official loans to Africa had been just in the millions of dollars. Imports from China are somewhat more varied, although concentrated on the regional powerhouses of South Africa and Nigeria, and consist mainly of machinery and transport equipment (38%), manufactured goods (30%), and miscellaneous articles (22%) (ibid.). support open access publishing. 389-408. To break free from dependency on outside actors and grow, there must be a willingness among the consortium to take responsibility for the development of the African continent which should be done in-house. What Were the Causes and Consequences of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War? These largely amicable Sino-African relations dwindled in the late 1970s, with Africa viewed as increasingly marginal to post-Mao era Chinese interests of market-led modernization and rapprochement with the West and the Soviet Union (Taylor, 2009: 13-16). China’s alternative model of development and its combination of investment, aid and trade has been argued to provide African states with the ability to choose their own path for development and hence, increasing their independence in face of Western powers (Swedlund 2017, p. 392). Over the last decade, Chinese involvement has also contributed to the continent’s renewed economic growth, as increased demand has proceeded in tandem with rising commodity prices (Zafar, 2007)[5]. It has courted African leaders by holding regular high-level summits, providing extensive state-organised receptions, and arranging numerous visits to the continent by high-ranking Chinese politicians – it has become tradition, for example, that the Chinese foreign minister’s first overseas visit each year is to an African country (Taylor, 2009: 24). Secondly, Africa represents an expanding market to which China can export its cheap manufactured goods and represent long-term financial investment (Okolo & Akwu 2016, p. 47). Scholars who view China’s involvement in Africa as negative have generally described such relations in terms of power asymmetry between the economic giant and the politically vulnerable African governments. China has sought, and with some degree of success, to construct an ‘exceptionalist’ approach toward African states, as based on mutual benefit and political equality, one that differs from the paternalistic and highly conditional approach so often proffered by Western states and IFIs (Alden Large, 2011). Ove godine, zbog epidemiološke situacije, škola će se održavati u online okruženju. Hurst Publishers Ltd: London. Written for: Dr Benjamin Habib China’s resource gambit is not just confined to petroleum. FOCAC (2006) China’s African Policy. For example, despite the overwhelming differences in power between China and African states, FOCAC’s inaugural declaration recognised all as “developing countries with common fundamental interests” that included “consolidating solidarity… and facilitating the establishment of a new international order” (FOCAC, 2000). In this vein, Ehizuelen (2017, p. 342) sheds light on Africa’s staggering need for infrastructure with an estimated $ 93 billion dollar per year for the next decade in order to seal Africa’s infrastructure gap. Almost 100% of Angola and Sudan’s exports to China are made up of crude oil, for example, while only South Africa has a relatively diversified export profile. In addition, in refuting Chinese exclusive investment focused on extractive resources, some scholars have pointed to China’s debt relief activities (up to 10 billion yuan of loans to African states) and investment in non-resource rich states such as Guinea-Bissau (Chen 2016, p. 113; Zhu 2017, p. 31). The Economist (2000) Hopeless Africa. In The Economist, 11 March. Politically aid has been used to create a strong bilateral relationship between Africa and China. 5, pp. The sway of African governments toward Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) programmes is the result of a general disillusionment after decades of Western developmental aid projects which resulted in the entrenched “underdevelopment” of Africa (Campbell 2008, p. 99). Another powerful argument brought forward by scholars who view Sino-African relations in a favourable light is the perceived increased agency of African states. On independence, few states therefore possessed the requisite attributes of traditional empirical sovereignty – instead being so-called ‘quasi-states’ that possessed governments “deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organized power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic welfare” (Jackson, 1993: 21). Angola, for example, has used the opportunity of increased Chinese trade and investment, including at least $7 billion in low-cost loans, to fund vital post-civil war reconstruction (Corkin, 2011). And third, China’s development aid assistance to Africa represents an effort to enhance its soft power and influence abroad by providing an alternative development model to the Washington Consensus, and securing support of African states within international institutions (Zhu 2017, p. 26; p. 29; p. 32). 341-359. 6, no. 1-13. However, African states have also enjoyed some degree of agency and have, to some extent, benefitted from economic and infrastructural development. This economic colonization of Africa has done and continues Brautigam (2009: 154-157) suggests, however, that this problem is often exaggerated and is itself a policy choice of African governments who now increasingly recruit local workers. In 2006, China has released its first African Policy Paper characterising Chinese engagement with Africa as enshrining the concepts of equality, non-interference and mutual benefits (Ncube 2012; p. 22; Chen 2016, p. 113; Zhu 2017, p. 32). Any Samy, Y. Diversification may be further inhibited by so-called ‘Dutch disease’, as rising currency values make other exports less competitive, whilst the volatility of commodity prices could leave states vulnerable to further boom-and-bust cycles, with price shocks raising debt levels and undermining long-term development plans (Shaxson, 2005). Other scholars have advanced a more speculative argument on China’s sincere sympathy for African states developmental struggles. Le public aura l’occasion de découvrir la riche collection de décorations et de médailles que Pavle Beljanski a reçues entre 1919 et 1959, au cours de sa fructueuse carrière diplomatique. 14 December 2006. Without having to submit to the structural reforms required by the IMF or World Bank, however, this alternative has provided the Angolan government with the political space to pursue its own model of ‘illiberal peacebuilding’, de-emphasising civil liberties, rule of law, or economic freedoms, and “with a view to constructing a hegemonic order and an elite stranglehold over the political economy” (Soares de Oliveira, 2011: 288).
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