[xvi] For two assessments, see Jinting Deng, “The National Supervision Commission: A new anti-corruption model in China,” International Journal of Law, Crime & Justice, Vol. [xlix] Moreover, a number of domestic security officials at the municipal and prefectural levels have been purged. Xi has created new institutions, such as the Central National Security Commission and the National Supervision Commission, to improve coordination among the various agencies of the coercive apparatus and to tighten discipline and anti-corruption efforts within the party-state. New institutions such as the CNSC and NSC and restructuring in the PAP have sought to improve coordination within and tighten party discipline over the various agencies of the coercive apparatus. [lvii] “Wo shenbian de wangge yuan” [The grid member around me], Politics and Law Committee of the Nanjing Municipal CCP, 4 June 2018, at http://www.njzf.gov.cn/cxwghshzl/201806/t20180604_5416204.html. Other prominent officials within the public security apparatus who have been purged since 2012 include former Vice Minister of Public Security Li Dongsheng (李东生) and Vice Minister of Public Security and head of Interpol Meng Hongwei (孟宏伟). The Central National Security Commission reports to the party leadership and holds a higher rank than the regular leading small groups. Apart from observing residents and gathering information, grid managers and their public security counterparts sometimes engage in soft forms of repression, such as persuasion and intimidation, to preemptively demobilize potential political dissent. Her first book, Dictators & Their Secret Police (Cambridge, 2016) received the 2017 Best Book Award from both the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. [xxx] James Mulvenon, “So crooked they have to screw their pants on, Part 3: Guo Boxiong edition,” China Leadership Monitor, No. As part of this effort, provincial and local governments are investing heavily in various types of surveillance technologies. [ix] At an April 2018 meeting, the CNSC adopted a regulation that strengthened the CCP’s leadership and coordination role in national security affairs and outlined the responsibilities of party leaders and committees to ensure that party directives are implemented. [lxi]  One recent Reuters report highlights a 2017–18 increase in the procurement of smartphone data-extraction devices, which have been purchased in 32 of China’s 33 provinces. Apart from observing residents and gathering information, grid managers and their public security counterparts sometimes engage in soft forms of repression, such as persuasion and intimidation, to preemptively demobilize potential political dissent. [xiv] “China focus: Proposed constitutional revisions to navigate China into modernization,” Xinhua, 27 February 2018, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/27/c_137003886.htm. [iv] The changes in recent years are designed to strengthen Xi and the CCP’s control over the domestic security apparatus and over Chinese society. Mason Richey, Senior Contributing Writer to Asia Society Korea as well as an Associate Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, hosted an online roundtable with H.E. [lxvii], The CCP’s Changing Security Strategy in Xinjiang, In recent years the CCP has carried out increasingly stringent security measures in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Meng’s removal completed a changing of the guard at the Ministry of Public Security (gong’anbu, 公安部). [lxxiv], Early 2017 marked a further intensification and broadening of the CCP’s coercive efforts in the form of wide-scale extrajudicial detentions and internments aimed at mass indoctrination and re-education. in terms of China’s successful model of pandemic management and global health leadership,” Sheena Greitens, who … She did this by visiting the home of the resident with a mediator and a local public security official (tiaojieyuan, 调解员 and minjing, 民警) to discuss his concerns and caution him of the “severe consequences and risks” (yanzhong houguo he weihai, 严重后果和危害) from seeking extreme solutions to his problem. In each grid, a grid manager and related staff collect information, identify and report potential problems, and address resident complaints. [xxvii], Personnel Changes within the Domestic Security Apparatus. [vii] By 2012–13, public security journals reflected a growing consensus that the CCP still lacked effective information-sharing and coordination mechanisms for security-related decision-making. Additionally, in summer 2018 provincial-level public security officials in Chongqing, Shandong, Henan, and Hubei were removed, investigated, and expelled from the party, as were lower-level public security officials in Henan, Hunan, Anhui, Shanxi, Hainan, Guilin, Shenzhen, Hebei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. 232 (December 2017): 1002–1025. The IJOP collects data from video cameras, security checkpoints, and other official records, uses predictive algorithms to analyze it, and then provides the information to local officials so they can respond rapidly. Early coverage in the official media indicated that it would focus on “holistic” or “overall national security” (zongti guojia anquanguan, 总体安全观) in eleven broad areas, including both external and internal security issues. She did this by visiting the home of the resident with a mediator and a local public security official (tiaojieyuan, 调解员 and minjing, 民警) to discuss his concerns and caution him of the “severe consequences and risks” (yanzhong houguo he weihai, 严重后果和危害) from seeking extreme solutions to his problem. [li] Ting Gong, “Dangerous collusion: Corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 222 (June 2015): 339–539. The new NSC represents a significant effort to build on earlier attempts to strengthen the power and independence of the party-state’s discipline apparatus and to institutionalize Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts at a high level within the party-state. [xxix] Yuhua Wang and Carl Minzner, “The rise of the Chinese security state,” China Quarterly, No. “I think it highly likely that China will frame the Winter Games ... in terms of China’s successful model of pandemic management and global health leadership,” Sheena Greitens, who teaches Asian politics at the University of Texas, said in an email. [xxxviii] The most recent high-profile arrest is that of Meng Hongwei, who formerly headed China’s Interpol branch (2004–16), and in 2016 became president of Interpol while concurrently serving as vice minister of public security. [lxxi] In 2014, party leaders launched the “Strike Hard against Violent Terrorist Activity” Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动) that included a small-scale re-education component. The CCDI is led by Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member Zhao Leiji (赵乐际), who succeeded Wang Qishan in fall 2017, whereas CCDI deputy Yang Xiaodu (杨晓渡) leads the NSC. 219 (September 2014): 597–624. [xxvi] Although some of the more controversial measures that were included in the initial draft laws have now been eliminated, collectively the new laws strengthen and expand the power of the party-state in both domestic and external security, and they are intended to tighten control and to crack down on activists and other actors within Chinese civil society. [lviii], As part of this effort, provincial and local governments are investing heavily in various types of surveillance technologies. At the district level, information from the grids is integrated with other layers of data (on public utilities, traffic, sanitation, housing, population, crime, etc. These measures are often attributed to two factors: the outbreak of unrest and protests that occurred among the Uighur population beginning in 2008–9; The CCP has pointed to a series of incidents of unrest, attacks, and clashes between police and protestors that occurred within and beyond the borders of the XUAR from 2009 to 2015 as evidence of a serious security and terrorist threat from Uighur separatism. Organizationally, the biggest changes include the establishment of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) (zhongyang guojia anquan weiyuanhui, 中央国家安全委员会), announced in November 2013; the creation of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) (guojia jiancha weiyuanhui, 国家监察委员会), created in 2018; and the restructuring of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) (zhongguo renmin wuzhuang jingcha budui, 中国人民武装警察部队) in 2017-18. This restructuring abolished the previous dual command structure, under which the PAP reported both to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and State Council; as of 1 January 2018, the PAP resides “under the unified control” of the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. [lxxviii] This narrative has been assisted by members of related organizations taking responsibility for or praising some of the higher-profile attacks, but estimates about how many Uighurs have traveled to Syria or the Middle East to fight with ISIS (and how many have survived that struggle as of today) vary widely. “I think it highly likely that China will frame the Winter Games . 1 Distinguished Commissioners, fellow panelists, and guests, thank you for inviting me today to speak about the issue of technological surveillance of religion in China. See Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor, March 1, 2019, https://www. This restructuring abolished the previous dual command structure, under which the PAP reported both to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and State Council; as of 1 January 2018, the PAP resides “under the unified control” of the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. In early 2017, XUAR authorities initiated an “Accurate Census and Population Verification Program” (全疆人口精准核查) with an emphasis on southern Xinjiang (where the Uighur population is concentrated); the program is intended to collect both biographical  and biological information on Uighur residents that may be used to determine the political reliability of individuals. Zhou Yongkang’s son Zhou Bin and other family members were implicated in bribery; other senior figures in Zhou’s network who have been arrested or investigated include Li Chuncheng, former deputy party secretary of Sichuan; Other prominent officials within the public security apparatus who have been purged since 2012 include former Vice Minister of Public Security Li Dongsheng (李东生) and Vice Minister of Public Security and head of Interpol Meng Hongwei (孟宏伟). This integrated information platform is then shared across multiple government departments, including public security; it is intended to facilitate early identification of social-management problems so that they can be resolved proactively. By 2015, it is estimated that at least 168 of China’s 332 prefectural-level cities were using grid management for social management and social control. This framing, however, also points to China’s long-standing concern with linkages between domestic unrest and hostile forces outside of China, in particular in this context fears of Uighur separatism forming operational links with al-Qaeda and now ISIS. 6 (2015): 31–37. For instance, one recent profile of a Nanjing grid manager praises her for preventing a resident from organizing a group of petitioners who planned to travel to Beijing. 232 (November 2017): 895. Associate Professor of Public Affairs Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs University of Texas at Austin. [lxxiii] Adrian Zenz, “China’s domestic security spending: An analysis of available data,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. [lxix] The heightened security measures have targeted an increasingly broad swathe of the Uighur population and have focused on detention and political re-education under the guise of “vocational training.”  In a periodic report on China, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination raises concern about the “numerous and credible” reports of mass detentions in the XUAR, including estimates that upwards of one million Uighurs have been held for re-education and that Muslims are being treated as “enemies of the state solely on the basis of their ethno-religious identity.”[lxx], The CCP has pointed to a series of incidents of unrest, attacks, and clashes between police and protestors that occurred within and beyond the borders of the XUAR from 2009 to 2015 as evidence of a serious security and terrorist threat from Uighur separatism. New Organizational Structures and New Laws. [lxii] Officials and technology companies generally highlight the cutting-edge use of data and technology (biometrics, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and the like) as an example of China’s global leadership in this sector, and they emphasize the benefits of this approach for public safety—for example, quoting a daughter in Changsha who credited the Tianwang system with quickly finding her lost mother. [xlviii], There are few signs that the anti-corruption campaign within the public security apparatus has run its course. Meng was detained on a return trip to China in October 2018, and the CCDI issued a terse statement acknowledging that he was under investigation by the NSC. 59 (March). [vi] You Ji, “China’s National Security Commission: Theory, evolution, and operations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. [lx] Efforts are also underway to extend the approach into rural areas with the so-called “Bright Snow Project” (xueliang gongcheng, 雪亮工程), which accelerated in 2015–16. Xi Jinping also oversaw a significant restructuring of the People’s Armed Police in 2017-18. There was some belief that in the past this fragmentation had prevented Chinese leaders from receiving the information needed to make decisions in a timely, proactive manner. [lix] “Chinese startup makes facial recognition glasses for police,” Nikkei Asian Review, 21 August 2018, at https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Chinese-startup-makes-facial-recognition-glasses-for-police, [lx] “In your face: China’s all-seeing state,” BBC News, 10 December 2017, at 42248056/in-your-face-china-s-all-seeing-state;" target="_blank">https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-42248056/in-your-face-china-s-all-seeing-state; “Tian wang gongcheng zhineng renlian jiankong xitong zai ying tiaozhan zhe 5 fen 22 miao bei zhuahuo” [Skynet Engineering intelligent face monitoring system and challenger captured in 5 minutes and 22 seconds], security.asmag.com.cn, 19 March 2018, at http://security.asmag.com.cn/news/201803/93606.html, [lxi] “Quanguo xueliang gongcheng jianshe Beijing” [Background to the construction of the National Snow Project], 13 October 2017, at  http://www.21csp.com.cn/zhanti/xlgcfx/article/article_15369.html, [lxii] “From laboratory in the far west, China’s surveillance state spreads quietly,” Reuters, 14 August 2018, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-monitoring-insight/from-laboratory-in-far-west-chinas-surveillance-state-spreads-quietly-idUSKBN1KZ0R3, [lxiii] “‘Tian wang’ wang shenme” [What is the Tianwang network? Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, where she focuses on East Asia, American national security, and authoritarian politics and foreign policy. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor, Vol. 59 (Spring 2019), www.prcleader.org/greitens; and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Guonei shequ wanggehua guanli yanjiu zongshu” [Summary of research on internal community grid management], October 28, 2013, http://www.cssn.cn/sf/bwsf_gl/201312/t20131205_895684.shtml. It has jurisdiction over a broad range of civil servants and “persons who perform public duties,” with the notable exception of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). China's paramount leader, Xi Jinping, sees himself as a savior, anointed to steer the Communist Party and China away from corruption and foreign influence, into a … 98 (2016): 178–196; see also David M. Lampton, “Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: Policy coordination and political power,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. These efforts have occupied a central and visible place in his governance; for example, in 2015 Xinhua listed knife handle (daobazi, 刀把子), a euphemism for the party’s domestic security forces, as one of twelve phrases that Xi used most frequently during his first two years in office.